

BALTIC SEA STRATEGY FORUM 2017

"Baltic Sea Security:
Today and Tomorrow"

**Åbo Akademi University
Vaasa, Finland
30th November 2017**

Conference Documentation

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Candidate: LCDR Stefan Lundqvist, Swedish Defence University.	
Opponent: Professor Dr. Joachim Krause, Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University.	

CONFERENCE AGENDA



PROGRAMME

Registration & Welcome Coffee **08:45–09:45**

PRECEDING EVENT:

Public PhD viva voce **10:00–12:00**

Chair: Dr. Steve Lindberg, Åbo Akademi
University

Candidate: LCDR Stefan Lundqvist, Swedish
Defence University

Opponent: Professor Dr. Joachim Krause,
Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University

Refreshments **12:00–12:30**

Examination Board Deliberations and
Announcement of PhD Grading

Additional Registration Opportunity **12:00–12:30**

Networking Lunch **13:00–13:30**

BALTIC SEA STRATEGY FORUM 2017

Welcome Address

13:30–13:40

Professor Mikko Hupa,
President, Åbo Akademi University

Introduction to the forum

13:40–13:50

COL Hans Granlund,
Director Military Programmes, Swedish
Defence University
Dr. Sebastian Bruns,
Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University

Panel

Chair: LtCol Anders Enström, Swedish Defence
University

13:50–15:30

Panelists:

Jeremy Stöhs, Institute for Security Policy at
Kiel University: From Backwaters to
Battlefront? Changing Views Along Europe's
Northern Shores

Dr. Gary John Schaub Jr, Centre for Military
Studies at the University of
Copenhagen: Russia, Hybrid Threats and the
Baltic Sea Region

RADM Jens Nykvist, Chief of Staff, Royal
Swedish Navy: The Baltic Sea:
Strengthening Maritime Security Through
Cooperation

Vin d'honneur, Coffee and Networking

15:30–16:30

Registered participants

Press Conference

16:00–16:30

Symposium panellists and organisers

Symposium/Doctoral Dinner

19:00–22:00

Registered participants

INTRODUCTION TO THE FORUM

COL Hans Granlund



BIO

Colonel Granlund currently holds position as Director Military Programmes at the Swedish Defence University. He started his career in the Marines. Early assignments was in artillery and coastal defence and from there it led into brigade staff (operations), command of 1st battalion 1st Marine

INTRODUCTION

In this rapidly changing world, maritime cooperation between the Baltic Sea nations is of utter importance. It is a very challenging environment and an uncertain time that we are entering into, and the naval cooperation in these times is of vital importance. This strategic forum is the first in a series, and I wish that it will shed more light on this complex matter.

If we don't understand what we are dealing with, something might go terribly wrong. Questions related to maritime cooperation need to be studied at the highest level, and defence universities need to have more people that understand both the military profession and the academic side of the matters.

Regiment and joint and naval assignment in the Navy Staff Swedish and Armed Forces Headquarters. Colonel Granlund is a graduate of the US Marine Corps Command & Staff colleges and have deployed to Sudan as part of the Joint Military Commission/Joint Military Mission. Of lately he comes from a position as National Liaison officer at NATO Allied Command for Transformation and US Joint Staff J6. Before that he was the Naval Attaché in Washington DC and Mexico City and previous to that, Chief of staff of the Swedish Joint Forces Command. Colonel Granlund holds a Master's degree from US Marine Corps University, and is a fellow of the Royal Society of Naval Sciences.

"If we don't understand what we are dealing with, something might go terribly wrong. Questions related to maritime cooperation need to be studied at the highest level, and defence universities need to have more people that understand both the military profession and the academic side of the matters."

One main challenge is how to communicate these issues. The participants at the Forum are probably all believers, but it is a key topic to identify how to communicate these complex matters to politicians, and the general population. If we can formulate ways to do this, we have pushed the front forward. Therefore I welcome this opportunity to share light on maritime security and strategies in the Baltic Sea setting.



FROM BACKWATERS TO BATTLEFRONTS?

Jeremy Stöhs



BIO

Jeremy Stöhs is an Austrian-American defense analyst at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) and its adjunct Center for Maritime Strategy & Security. He is also a non-resident fellow of the Austrian Center for Intelligence, Propaganda and Security Studies (ACIPSS).

CHANGING VIEWS ALONG EUROPE'S NORTHERN SHORES

Before looking at the current security challenges and corresponding strategies in the Baltic Sea region, it is necessary to take a brief look back at recent history. With the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, the contest between East and West seemed to have come to an end. The evolving security architecture and newly drawn political map demanded new approaches to how military forces were to be used, and to how Europe would structure its defense and security.

The period between 1991 – 2001 can be characterized as including novel threats and a new understanding of the use of military force. During this time, most military challenges were developing along Europe's southern flank and European naval forces were deployed outside their traditional areas of operation, answering to threats from the south in military operations such as Desert Storm, Southern Watch, Sharp Guard, and others.

Jeremy has studied in Austria, Germany, and the United States, holds a master's degree in history and English, and teaches at the University of Kiel where he is currently pursuing his PhD on the evolution of European naval power since the end of the Cold War. He has written articles and chapters on various defense and security related issues, and has authored the book *The Decline of European Naval Forces: Challenges to Sea Power in an Age of Fiscal Austerity and Political Uncertainty* (Naval Institute Press, 2018). Prior to his studies, Jeremy worked in law enforcement with the Austrian Federal Police for a number of years.

This constituted a conceptual change, in concordance with a doctrinal shift that emphasized multilateralism, cooperative security, and a situation where many naval forces from European states were increasingly deployed to regions further away from home.

Meanwhile, the situation along the northern flank looked different and arguably less challenging. The drastic decline of the Russian military and navy had a significant bearing on the security environment. New collaborative efforts intended to include Russia, the former enemy, into the security architecture, for example by way of the Arctic Council and the Partnership for Peace program.

It is important to note that there is a sense that for the last twenty years, the northern flank has been largely overlooked in military planning and has become somewhat of a backwater in strategic maritime interest. We however have to keep two points in mind: first, the waters along the northern shores have always been the main area of operation for the navies of the countries in this respective region, not least, due to the importance of safeguarding territorial waters and exclusive economic zones. Second, the northern waters have not been forgotten by other countries either, such as the U.S., Britain, and France, since their nuclear ballistic submarines are continuously deployed to the deep waters of the North Atlantic. Further north (in the Barents Sea and Arctic Ocean), the same goes for their Russian counterparts. Thereby, these major powers always keep at least one eye on Europe's northern flank.

"There is a sense that for the last twenty years, the northern flank has been largely overlooked in military planning and has become somewhat of a backwater in strategic maritime interest."



"After what is considered to be two decades of neglect, the security challenges posed by Russia along Europe's northern shores are again front and center."

During the 1990s, the size and inherent flexibility of naval forces across Europe were sufficient to deal with most tasks that were appointed to them by their respective political leadership. However, the period between 2001 – 2014 led to the lowest point of European naval power since the beginning of modern age. In light of the terrorist attacks on 11 September 2001 and the ensuing war against terrorism, the necessity to conduct out of the area-operations and support land forces in theaters such as Iraq or Afghanistan drew attention away from the maritime domain. When we discuss the effects of 9/11 this fact is often overlooked. In addition, the financial crisis from 2007 onwards led to substantial defense cuts in many areas, particularly in the naval sector.

That brings us to today: after what is considered to be two decades of neglect, the security challenges posed by Russia along Europe's northern shores are again front and center. Some claim that the waters have again become a battlefield between East and West – and that the U.S. and its allies are again fighting a “battle for the Atlantic”. Since Russia's military interventions in Ukraine and Syria, NATO and its allies have had to revisit their strategic, operational, and tactical approaches to collective defensive security. For the first time since the end of the Cold War, the northern flank in general – and the Norwegian Sea and Baltic Sea more specifically – have again become the focus of public attention. Russia's growing military presence in the north requires adequate, yet measured responses. More traditional war fighting capabilities in the Baltic and the North Sea, and the Atlantic in general, are needed, and solutions are being sought. Although, this will take time.

It however must not be overlooked that future challenges will continue to be multi-regional and range across the intensity spectrum. Hence, European naval forces (including those in the Baltic Sea region) must be tailored to effectively deal with a multitude of quickly changing security scenarios; at home and abroad.



RUSSIA, HYBRID THREATS, AND THE BALTIC SEA REGION

Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr.



"The more salient and ongoing challenges faced in the region are hybrid in nature and cannot be met by the Alliance. They require the states of the region to take action."

HYBRID THREATS

Hybrid threats pose significant challenges to security in the Baltic Sea region. While refugees and radicals pose nonstate challenges in other parts of Europe, Russia demands attention from the littoral states of the Baltic Sea. Essentially, I argue that Russia has not yet adjusted to the power realities that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and unfortunately for the Russians, this power distribution problem is not going to go away. Nor is the liberal international order that constrains and channels state behaviour in ways that Russia finds to be disadvantageous. Western efforts to deepen and widen these institutions have been interpreted by Russian leaders, particularly President Putin, to threaten Russia's position and security. They have also challenged the basis for sustaining Putin's regime in power and keeping his personal entourage comfortable and living nicely. These imperatives are driving the domestic politics of Russia as well as their international behavior.

BIO

Dr. Gary Schaub, Jr. is a Senior Researcher at the Centre for Military Studies, Department of Political Science, University of Copenhagen. He previously has been a consultant to the Institute for Defense Analyses, an Assistant Professor of Strategy at the U.S. Air War College, a Research Fellow at the U.S. Air Force Research Institute, a Visiting Assistant Professor at the U.S. Air Force School of Advanced Air and Space Studies, a Researcher at the Center for International Studies at the University of Pittsburgh, and an Adjunct Assistant Professor of History at Chatham College. He is editor of Understanding

To counter these challenges, Russia has adopted a policy that I term defensive revanchism. They are pursuing this policy throughout the post-Soviet space where the Russians have traditionally believed that they ought to have primacy and substantial influence. They have relied on certain types of techniques, tactics, and procedures to destabilize and challenge the legitimacy of their neighbors and rebuild a buffer zone along their border, behind which they can remain secure as long as everyone around them is insecure.

Furthermore, they are pursuing opportunities to interfere and disrupt beyond this geographical area as they arise. One example is the US 2016 election, where an opportunity to disrupt liberal democratic processes presented itself and was seized upon to an extent that was heretofore unimaginable.

The primary threat facing the Baltic Sea region is basically a hybrid threat, but it is backstopped by substantial conventional forces with the possibility of escalation to the nuclear level. The imbalance of both geography and conventional forces drives NATO planning to deal with the conventional threat of a rapid occupation of the Baltic states. The Russians can easily drive through the borders and into the capitals of the Baltic states and seize that territory, within two and a half days. The Russians could then stop with this strategically strong position and wait for a possible response.

"Russia has not yet adjusted to the power realities that led to the dissolution of the Soviet Union, and unfortunately for the Russians, this power distribution problem is not going to go away."

Cybersecurity: Emerging Governance and Strategy (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018), co-editor of Private Military and Security Contractors: Controlling the Corporate Warrior (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), and author of numerous articles, book chapters, and policy reports on deterrence, nuclear weapons, airpower, strategy, military education, and European security. He earned his Doctorate in Public and International Affairs from the University of Pittsburgh, his Master of Arts from the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and his Bachelor of Science from Carnegie Mellon University.

The primary strategic objective for NATO in the region is to avoid such a scenario. This can be done by, first of all, prepositioning troops in the Baltic States and Poland so they are close by and can quickly reach the area. Yet these forces are not meant to defend the Baltic states. NATO has put these enhanced forces there as a tripwire: placing multinational forces in the line of fire that will cause politicians to suddenly pay attention if they are attacked. Unfortunately for those who are deployed there, they are effectively sacrificial lambs to ensure a follow-up response. Such a response from NATO will primarily be based upon airpower, backed up by maritime forces, to resecure NATO territory.

But this is the conventional threat. It is familiar and, in broad outlines, easy to plan against. It is also not particularly likely given the strength and unity of NATO and the commitment of its members to collective defense under Article 5.

The more salient and ongoing challenges faced in the region are hybrid in nature and cannot be met by the Alliance. They require the states of the region to take action. One challenge that has recently begun to receive attention is the use of civilian assets, for example, commercial or fishing vessels, to implement paramilitary operations. Such platforms could be equipped with light arms, commercial off-the-shelf communication systems, and other things that can be easily removed or hidden and then put back in place when necessary. Imagining such threats is an easy conceptual leap from the “little green men” that made headlines in Crimea.

But this paramilitary threat is just one part of a multidimensional problem. Hybrid warfare primarily focuses on information operations that divide targeted societies and prevent them from responding effectively. One challenge that has recently begun to receive attention is the use of civilian assets, for example commercial or fishing vessels, to implement paramilitary operations.



"We have faced these kinds of challenges in the low-intensity operations that the West has fought in non-developed, non-democratic states in the past ten years. But now these challenges have come home, and we still have work to do."

Such platforms could be equipped with light arms, commercial off-the-shelf communication systems, and other things that can be easily removed or hidden and then put back in place when necessary. Imagining such threats is an easy conceptual leap from the "little green men" that made headlines in Crimea.

But this paramilitary threat is just one part of a multidimensional problem. Hybrid warfare primarily focuses on information operations that divide targeted societies and prevent them from responding effectively. Liberal democracies have many cleavages to exploit. In fact, the institutions of liberal democracies are built upon the assumption that society is divided in many ways, and they have therefore come up with institutional rules to dampen and reconcile these cleavages in a nice and orderly manner, such as through voting or making compromises. Throwing sand into the gears of such machinery is one of the primary things that Russian information operations are designed to do.

For example, an effective way of exacerbating societal cleavages is to build up a consistent set of critical narratives and deploy them as opportunities arise with a rather decentralized and dispersed network of civilians or half-civilians, who, for example, are trolling on Facebook or Twitter, or via regular media. The objective of such operations is to disrupt democratic and liberal processes. We have faced these kinds of challenges in the low-intensity operations that the West has fought in non-developed, non-democratic states in the past ten years. But now these challenges have come home, and we still have work to do: we have become complacent with regard to understanding how our institutions work and what is necessary to keep them functioning well.



"Another part of the solution is to increase civilian professional actors' awareness by, for example, enhancing the monitoring of ports, so you know what is coming in or out."

Furthermore, analysing the quality of, and threats toward, critical infrastructure is very important, because this is a central part of the glue that holds societies together. Governments prove their worth by providing common services for their people and disrupting these services is an effective way of creating tensions. The potential disruption of communication systems, such as the cell phone networks or cutting undersea communication cables, therefore are a potential dimension of the hybrid threat. If even some of these cables were cut, the countries in the region could easily be isolated from international communications. There is no emergency response system for this infrastructure, repairs are managed by private sector companies, and cables take weeks to find and fix. Thus, providing both physical security and cybersecurity to prevent intrusions into infrastructure systems is crucial.

Some solutions to handle these hybrid threats have been proposed. First, increased sharing of indicators of warning – the thing about hybrid warfare in general is that it occurs in a grey zone. It is only grey because no one is coding what is black and what is white. If you'd look at indicators, and understand what they mean, you could add smaller things together and realize that it may not be a coincidence that five very different things are happening at once. And what about the paramilitary threats? Increased public awareness is needed—citizens that see suspicious actions should be encouraged to report it.

One of the nice things about the Baltic Sea region is that most societies are quite homogenous, the people know who is and who is not a local. Another part of the solution is to increase civilian professional actors' awareness by, for example, enhancing the monitoring of ports, so you know what is coming in or out. As this suggests, hybrid type threats are going to occur in a domestic context that may fall between the authorities of defence ministries and police agencies, and thus increasing the cooperation between them is imperative. Enhanced intelligence sharing is also important. The governments of this region could go beyond pooling publicly available reporting and share certain levels of classified material as well.



"It is only grey because no one is coding what is black and what is white. If you'd look at indicators, and understand what they mean, you could add smaller things together and realize that it may not be a coincidence that five very different things are happening at once."

On a societal level, considering the role that institutions such as schools or militaries used to play bridge societal gaps and seams is crucial. Militaries historically have been used to educate good citizens as well as train soldiers, but the reach and focus of these institutions have narrowed as they have become more professionalised, and it may be useful to consider how they can be adapted to once again perform both functions. Combatting fake news and protecting the integrity of journalism, as well as defending both hard and soft points in the election system has recently been shown to be central. Furthermore, implementing basic computer hygiene and practices that can remove cyber vulnerabilities and reduce threats to infrastructure is very important. Finally, preplanning and establishing private-public relationships that enable contractors to easily and quickly repair damaged infrastructure is an area that deserves far greater attention. Each of these general recommendations require further thought and, importantly, action, if we are to thwart Russia's ambitions to increase their security by making everyone around them insecure.



THE BALTIC SEA: STRENGTHENING MARITIME SECURITY THROUGH COOPERATION

RADM Jens Nykvist



"If a conflict would happen, the warships that are present in the Baltic Sea will most likely be the ones we have to count on – at least during the first phases."

COOPERATION AT SEA

Maintaining freedom of the seas and access to the global maritime commons requires naval partnerships, cooperation and interoperability.

One of the most important topics in the Baltic Sea region is cooperation. The region has extensive maritime activity. Every day and minute there are around 2500 ships in the Baltic Sea bringing goods through the region. This lifeline is vital for all nations in the Baltic Sea region including Russia who ships approximately 40% of their goods through this region. Studies looking into the future even see an increase of transportation of goods in the coming years.

There is an increased interest of the region. One example of this is the increased military activity. For example, in September 2017 there were more ships in the Baltic Sea than for a very long time. In one of the largest navy exercises in the area, the Northern Coasts, 55 warships participated.

BIO

Rear Admiral Jens Nykvist has a background within the Swedish Submarine Force. He has worked in several positions onboard submarines and was the CO of the submarine HSwMS Gotland when it was stationed in San Diego, USA. RADM Nykvist was also in charge of the Swedish Contingent during HSwMS Gotland second year in the U.S. working at Third Fleet. He is a graduate of the Command College in Stockholm 2007-2009. After the Command College, he worked as the Chief of Staff at the Submarine Flotilla. The year 2011 he worked in the HQ as ACOS at the Joint Strategy and

At the same time, the Swedish exercise Aurora was executed. That exercise included roughly 20 additional warships to the already mentioned 55. In addition to this, the Russians held their exercise, ZAPAD, with approximately 20 participating warships during the same time – in other words, a lot of warships in a small congested area.

Together, all these activities create an increased degree of uncertainty. There is always a risk for misunderstandings somewhere along the line. The Swedish Navy, as well as the other navies in the region, operates in this complex and unique environment. A challenging environment with shallow waters with different sea temperatures due to season, a salinity that makes it challenging for sonars to detect something below the surface and narrow archipelagos. The short distances in the Baltic Sea result in short reaction times for the units. On top of this, we also need to take into account the non-military actors that are present in the area, such as the commercial shipping and flight traffic. It's essential to keep track of all these movements and to know the area to be able to identify the trigger and act if necessary – this is a vital part for the Swedish Navy.

The challenging terrain and environment require well-trained personnel and units with high maneuverability, flexibility and warfighting capabilities in order to meet all kind of actions in a broad spectrum of threats. The Navy needs to have the capability to work in the whole spectrum of naval conflict from sea surveillance to the high-end warfare. Our main operational concepts include maritime surveillance and reconnaissance, protection of shipping and coastal defense operations.

"These activities create an increased degree of uncertainty. There is always a risk for misunderstandings somewhere along the line."

Operational Staff. The year 2012-2013 he was a student at the Naval Command College (NCC 2013), Newport, USA and then he became head of Naval Operations at J3 Joint Strategy and Operational Staff. In December 2013 he was promoted to CAPT (N) and Commander 1st Submarine Flotilla. From April until September 2015 he worked as Chief of Staff in EU NAVFOR FHQ Operation Atalanta in Somali Basin/Gulf of Aden. When returning home he continued as Commander 1st Submarine Flotilla. The 4th May 2016 he was appointed as the Chief of Staff Royal Swedish Navy and promoted to Rear Admiral. RADM Nykvist also holds an MA in International Relations from Salve Regina University, Newport, USA.

Presence is vital in order to be able to track ship movements and recognize potential threats. By presence, we build a threshold towards an adversary or in other words by having a skilled crew on a warship with high-end warfare capabilities, you create deterrence. If we look into the future, we do not foresee any changes in what the navy needs to be able to handle. The navy will also in years to come need to have high readiness to work within the whole spectrum of naval conflicts. If a conflict would happen, the warships that are present in the Baltic Sea will most likely be the ones we have to count on – at least during the first phases – because it will probably be a hard task to bring in new ships from the North Sea and the Atlantic.

Regarding some cooperation, the most important form for the Swedish Navy is the Finnish-Swedish naval cooperation (FISE naval). The aim is a better usage of resources, cost efficiency in naval areas, and to increase our capabilities to gain security and stability in our region. One part of FISE is the Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group (SFNTG) who reached initial operational capability in 2017. SFNTG is a task group consisting of a pamphlet of capabilities (surface ships, amphibious forces, mine counter measures and logistics).

This capability provides to be used if necessary. Another part of FISE is the sea surveillance cooperation Finland-Sweden (SUCFIS). This cooperation has been ongoing since 2006, and provides an increased exchange of data regarding ship movements in the region. This has definitely led to an increased operational ability and also increased our understanding of what is out there.

In addition to SUCFIS, SUCBAS (Sea Surveillance Co-operation Baltic Sea) is a cooperation of exchanging ship movement data between nine nations, the Baltic nations except for Russia and the United Kingdom. Every nation determines the extent of their cooperation's and what data they want to provide. This cooperation provides a great opportunity to increase the understanding of the overall situation within the region.



"To use the navy as a political tool to start up a bilateral cooperation and to build trust amongst nations is very good."

Yet another example of cooperation in the Baltic Sea region is the Baltic Ordnance Safety Board (BOSB), which has been active since 2007. There are still approximately 50 000 mines out in the Baltic Sea, and through this cooperation member nations sets up a priority list of areas that need to be cleared from mines in operations like the so-called Open Spirit. Operations such as Open Spirit is another very good example of the importance of cooperation to increase the security in the region.

A vital part of cooperation is of course also exercises conducted in the Baltic Sea like the Northern Coasts exercise as already mentioned. Last year 16 different nations participated in Northern Coasts - that kind of commitment increases our interoperability and capabilities to build security and stability.

To use the navy as a political tool to start up a bilateral cooperation and to build trust amongst nations is very good. A navy does not leave a big footprint or need a lot of space to manoeuvre in another nation's territory. Navies can start cooperation's by meeting out at sea in international waters and conduct basic exercises, and build it from there. To conclude, partnerships are vital to face today's and tomorrow's challenges in the Baltic Sea region.



PRECEDING EVENT: PUBLIC PHD VIVA VOCE

Candidate LCDR Stefan Lundqvist, Swedish Defence University



"When international security pressure rose, structural realism fared better than neofunctionalism to explain the Finnish-Swedish naval cooperation. "

CHANGE AND CONTINUITY

In his compilation thesis, Lundqvist focuses on the conceptual development of Western maritime security strategies by posing four research questions, of which two address the strategies adopted and employed by the state actors examined, while two address the consequences thereof – and the lessons to be learnt – in the Baltic Sea as well as the East and South China Sea regions. By answering these questions, Lundqvist provides a theory-driven explanation to the continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region, in which Russia has declined and then re-emerged as a regional power. The focus of his study is non-aligned Finland and Sweden, whose security policies are in a state of transformation. In his thesis, continuity refers to a continued Cold War focus on military control of the maritime domain for the purpose of territorial defence, naval access, power projection and maritime trade.

BIO

Lieutenant Commander Stefan Lundqvist is a researcher and a teacher of Joint and Naval Operations at the Department of Military Studies at the Swedish Defence University (SEDU). In 2017, he completed a PhD in Political Science from Åbo Akademi University, Finland. Lundqvist joined SEDU in 2010, making a marked turn towards academia in his 20-year career as an active duty Royal Swedish Navy officer. Before joining SEDU, he served in various sea- and shore-based staff positions at the tactical and operational levels of command. His research interests include International Relations, maritime

Conversely, change involves the incorporation of wider, multi-sectoral definitions of security, focussed on fostering good order at sea to the benefit of many, by employing civilian and military resources in coalition operations to counter crime and terrorism in the maritime domain.

Lundqvist began his lectio by reflecting on the post-Cold War development of the term “maritime security”. He noted that in 1991, it referred to the naval component of international conflict and was integral of maritime strategies adopted at service level. The term’s use involved naval control of sea-lanes for power projection and strategic supply, and the provision of national merchant shipping capacity for these ends. In 2016, maritime security had become a relevant field of study in its own right, Lundqvist suggested, referring to comprehensive visions of managing threats, risks and opportunities in the maritime domain. He thus defined maritime security as a national security policy objective, including the full range of activities and interests in the maritime domain and their cross-domain interaction, while leaving the means appropriate for its pursuit open to empirical inquiry. To Lundqvist, maritime security strategies represent grand strategies for the maritime domain that outline the purposeful employment of all available instruments of power.

"Lundqvist provides a theory-driven explanation to the continuity and change in the post-Cold War maritime security strategies employed in the Baltic Sea region, in which Russia has declined and then re-emerged as a regional power."

security, comprehensive operational planning and operations assessment.

Lundqvist's articles have appeared in the RUSI Journal, Defence Studies and Journal of Defence Studies, while he has authored chapters in various edited books and proceedings. He has delivered presentations on maritime security at numerous conferences and events in Europe, as well as a pod-cast for Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC) in 2017.

Lundqvist continued by introducing the research design, the theoretical lenses used in his qualitative study, the criteria used for selecting the two regions of study and the process logic studied in the five articles. This logic, he explained, involves that actors at different level of analysis – but mainly states – adopt and employ maritime security strategies to manage threats to their military, economic, societal or environmental interests in the maritime domain posed by state and non-state actors.

Thereafter, Lundqvist presented some key aggregated empirical conclusions. The fact that sea power remains at heart of the US maritime security concept represents a conceptual continuity, he argued. Conceptual change, for its part, was due to the US shift in focus towards peacetime strategic competition with other great powers in altered economic and strategic contexts. The absence of peer US rivals in the 1990s gave way for strategies aimed at reaping the benefits of the global trade system by shaping it in its favour and a shift in US maritime security focus away from military confrontation.

Following the millennium plots and attacks on US Navy vessels and the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US used terrorism as a lever to implement Homeland Security initiatives among its allies and trading partners.

Lundqvist concluded that the US achieved this outcome by bilateral agreements and by influencing relevant international institutions.

The rise of China and Russia in the 2000s made them peer US competitors, and Russia a named adversary. Lundqvist pointed out that their shore and sea-based anti-access area denial capabilities posed increasingly severe threats to US naval access in the two studied regions..

"Following the millennium plots and attacks on US Navy vessels and the 11 September 2001 attacks, the US used terrorism as a lever to implement Homeland Security initiatives among its allies and trading partners."



Accordingly, the return of geopolitics and military threats to world politics explain the continuity and the most recent change in US maritime security strategy, he concluded. Thereto, a mix of traditional and non-traditional security threats necessitated the geographical widening of sea areas that require MARSEC.

Lundqvist completed his lectio by presenting a set of aggregated theoretical conclusions. Neofunctionalism, a regional integration theory used as a contrast to structural realism in his study of the Swedish-Finnish naval cooperation, provides convincing explanations to the initiation of their naval cooperation, he argued, since their heads of navies achieved political leverage for engaging in a bilateral cooperation to save costs and preserve capabilities. However, Lundqvist suggested that since international security pressure was low at the time, this finding does not invalidate the convincing explanations of structural realism. When international security pressure rose, structural realism fared better than neofunctionalism to explain the Finnish-Swedish naval cooperation. It intensified due to the need to deter Russia and not to cut costs, he concluded. Thereto, the role of regional organisations premised on liberal principles – such as ASEAN – appeared to be frail in times of high security pressure.



Lundqvist pointed out that China and Russia maintain their Strategic Partnership of Coordination, launched in 1994. When China and then Russia began to establish spheres of interests in their respective regions, Finland and Sweden jointly approached the US and NATO as “extended opportunities partners” and even implemented NATO HNS agreements. Structural realism readily explains such alignment, Lundqvist argued. However, the role of the small state needs to be nuanced in structural realism, he concluded, since willing and capable partners possessing territory critical to promoting US national interests have been able to punch beyond their weight in regions where the US faces a rival.

BALTIC SEA STRATEGY FORUM

Organising Committee

Professor Göran Djupsund, Åbo Akademi University, Vaasa

LCDR (PhD.c.) Stefan Lundqvist, Swedish Defence University, Stockholm

Dr. Sebastian Bruns, Center for Maritime Strategy & Security at the Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University

Dr. Henrik Ø. Breitenbauch, Centre for Military Studies at the University of Copenhagen

Symposium Administrators

Dr. Jenny Lindholm, Åbo Akademi University, Vaasa

Mr. Julian Pawlak, Center for Maritime Strategy & Security at the Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University

Conference Documentation

Dr. Klas Backholm, Åbo Akademi University, Vaasa

Layout: Dr. Jenny Lindholm, Åbo Akademi University, Vaasa

