Allied Maritime Strategy – The Means for Success in an Age of Great Power Competition

Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2019
Conference Report
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Opening

We need to better protect our infrastructure. There are threats to our sea lines of communication.

Keynote Address

Our standards of command and control have to be modified to meet future challenges. What works in the Atlantic may not work in the Baltics.

Panel 1

You cannot surge trust. There are limits to the use of military forces. We still need each other.

Panel 2

Cross-Domain Challenges, Joint Responses? Amphibious operations are like a Swiss-Army knife and should be an integral part of maritime forces.

Panel 3

High Level Intervention

Russia is seeking to destabilize the Atlantic Alliance. Politicians need to be made aware of maritime issues.
Dear colleague,

It is my great pleasure to present you with the conference report for this year’s Kiel International Seapower Symposium. The conference – the fifth of its kind on the occasion of the annual Kiel Week, Northern Europe’s largest maritime festival and a traditional naval event – brought more than 90 hand-picked experts from academia, the military, NGOs, industry, and the policy-world to the capital of Schleswig-Holstein. Together with the wealth of other maritime strategic work provided by our team of young and intrinsically motivated colleagues, the Kiel International Seapower Symposia have put Kiel on the map as the place to discuss international naval strategic and policy matters. Shared knowledge is empowerment. It is this spirit that creates a free and open discussion among friends and colleagues who may not always be of the same opinion, but can articulate this freely guarded by the Chatham House rule. Panelists and attendees are meticulously vetted for quality as well as current and future influence before they are approached with invitations. We are also keen to broaden the maritime security community through pairing senior naval experts and defence policy leaders with emerging and next-generation colleagues from the transatlantic community. Recent events and strategic trends point towards a much larger need for maritime expertise than ever before: If you wish to support our work at the non-profit think tank in Kiel, please consider a donation or research grant for one of our events. I am delighted that Dr. Alix Valenti, then-Chief Editor of Naval Forces, agreed to serve as author of this conference report. In addition, I would like to thank the KISS project manager Mr. Johannes Peters and my team at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University (ISPK) for the diligent effort they put into yet another successful symposium: Bravo Zulu!

Save the date for the Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2020: Tuesday, 23 June, Kiel, Germany. Follow us on Twitter (@seapowerseries) and visit www.kielseapowerseries.com for news, updates, and insights as well as future events and publications.

Dr. Sebastian Bruns
Head of Center for Maritime Strategy & Security at ISPK
Director of the Kiel Seapower Series
08:00 – 08:45
Registration & Welcome Coffee

08:45 – 09:00
Opening: Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)
- Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause

09:00 – 09:30
Keynote Address: How to create and manage the ‘means’ for NATO’s maritime strategy – a German Navy perspective
- Vice Admiral (DEU N) Andreas Krause, Chief of the Germany Navy, Naval Headquarters Rostock
- Chair: Dr. Sebastian Bruns, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)

09:30 – 11:00
Panel 1: “You Cannot Surge Trust”
- Dr. Constanze Stelzenmüller, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.
- Dr. Ruxandra-Laura Boşilică, Inland Norway University of Applied Sciences, Elverum
- Sarah Tarry, Defence Policy and Planning Division NATO, Brussels
- Chair: Dr. Sebastian Bruns, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)

11:00 – 11:30
Coffee Break, Snacks & Networking

11:30 – 13:00
Panel 2: Cross-Domain Challenges, Joint Responses?
- Dr. Viktoria Fedorchak, Maynooth University, Ireland
- Patrick O’Keeffe, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)
- Prof. Dr. Ian Speller, Maynooth University, Ireland
- Chair: Brigadier General (ret.) Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)

13:00 – 14:15
Lunch (Buffet) & Networking

14:15 – 14:45
High Level Intervention: NATO in the Age of Lost Certainties
- General (GBR Army) Sir James Everard, Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe, Mons, Belgium
- Chair: Jeremy Stöhs, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)

14:45 – 16:15
Panel 3: Beyond the Maritime Strategy Crystal Ball
- Dr. Viktoriya Fedorchak, Maynooth University, Ireland
- Patrick O’Keeffe, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)
- Prof. Dr. Ian Speller, Maynooth University, Ireland
- Chair: Brigadier General (ret.) Rainer Meyer zum Felde, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)

16:15 – 16:45
Coffee Break & Leg-Stretch

16:45 – 17:30
Keynote Conversation
- Vice Admiral (USA N) Lisa M. Franchetti, Commander, U.S. Sixth Fleet, Commander Naval Striking/Support Forces NATO, Dep. Commander, NAVEUR/NAVAF
- Vice Admiral (GBR N) Keith Blount, Commander Allied Maritime Command, Northwood, UK
- Jeremy Stöhs, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)
- Dr. Sebastian Bruns, Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)

17:30 – 19:00
Gin & Tonic Reception

ISPK wishes to thank the following entities for making this event possible through their generous support: NATO Public Diplomacy Division, Risk Intelligence ApS, Diehl Defence and Ince Law.
The 2018 US National Defence Strategy (NDS) reads: “It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model – gaining veto authority over nations’ economic, diplomatic and security decisions.” In this sentence alone, the NDS encapsulates one of the foremost defence paradigm shifts of the 21st century: the resurgence of great power competition. It is in this context that the Kiel International Seapower Symposium (KISS) seeks to question how NATO’s Allied Maritime Strategy (AMS) may be reviewed to adapt to changing, multi-domain threats. While last year’s KISS 2018 focused on the ‘ends’ of AMS itself, assessing it and seeking to provide an impetus for new documents, this year’s KISS 2019 looked at the ‘means’ to encourage a stronger NATO maritime strategy. From issues of cooperation and integration, to jointness as a means of extending the maritime strategy beyond the water’s edge and to sharing of information, intelligence and foresight, this year’s three panels have sought to set the scene for KISS 2020, which will focus on the strategic ‘ways’ to keep NATO’s maritime strategy relevant.
Panel 1: “You Cannot Surge Trust” – Implementing Maritime Strategy through Cooperation and Integration

The strategic environment of the 21st century demands more from the many countries: structural integration. However, with the resurfacing of great power competition, following a period that lulled Western powers into a false sense of security in the aftermath of the Cold War, comes a rude awakening. The relationships between NATO, Allies and the United States, on one end, are potentially at their worst since the creation of the Alliance in 1949. This is not just evidenced by Washington’s repeated calls for NATO countries to pull their share of the weight in terms of financial and human resources, but also transpires in this US administration’s tendency to weaponise economic interdependence through a series of threats it however does not appear to follow-up on. At the same time, Europe is increasingly divided by waves of nationalism sweeping through many of its member states. As a result, significant efforts to establish a common defence policy are thwarted by a lack of strategic resources needed to Europeanise production and trade, thus leaving the Union with little strategic defence autonomy and, to a certain extent, defenceless without the US.

As these crises unfold, the security situation around the US and the EU continues to considerably worry analysts and practitioners alike. As noted in the latest US National Defence Strategy (NDS), China and Russia are moving center stage in the great power competition, taking advantage of the deep political issues.
currently dividing NATO and the EU. And perhaps nowhere is this as discernible as it is in the maritime domain, where both Russia and China have been investing in procuring new capabilities and modernising old ones, challenging sea control and maritime access that US-led Western navies had enjoyed rather unhindered since the 1990s. Concurrently, the migrant crisis across and beyond the Mediterranean as well as piracy – in the Indian Ocean and elsewhere – are testing solidarity, cooperation and integration between NATO and the EU when member states have to re-learn and operationalise the war-fighting capabilities as well. In such a complex and divided geopolitical context, fostering the much-needed coordination and cooperation key to a successful structural integration of EU and NATO maritime efforts is no easy feat. Yet, despite the many issues highlighted by panelists in their speeches, a number of initiatives have been emerging that provide some hope for a coherent, integrated maritime strategy within the Alliance. At NATO level, there is a strong sense that 2019 is the naval year in what is an ever-more maritime century. This has favoured the elaboration of five main lines of effort to strengthen and enhance its maritime posture. Chiefly amongst those is the necessity to build a shared political understanding of the key maritime security challenges the Alliance faces. This is done through regional annual political military security assessments – for the Baltic, the Black Sea, the North Atlantic Ocean and the Mediterranean – and will be complemented this year by a comprehensive assessment of these regions’ security environment and capability developments in order to apprehend them in a holistic manner. Second, NATO will seek to employ its naval forces much more efficiently through, amongst other things, an improved framework of cooperation with the EU and other partners. Third, the Alliance will work at reinvigorating its war fighting function, somewhat set aside in the aftermath of the Cold War, through more robust exercise programmes and the NATO Readiness Initiative (NRI), which aims to ensure allied forces’ readiness with regard to training, supplies and capabilities. Fourth, NATO will strive to adapt and strengthen key enablers such as command and control, maritime situational awareness, and establish closer linkages between the military and the civil and commercial sectors. Finally, it will be necessary for the Alliance to deliver the required capabilities for a wide variety of missions, especially war fighting. These efforts within NATO should go some distance in facilitating more structural integration with the EU. Through a shared political understanding of key maritime security challenges, it might become easier to define a shared division of labour between the two structures that rests upon a recognised set of strengths and competences for each. This should, in turn, feed into NATO’s aim to reinvigorate its war fighting function and capabilities while providing a strategic framework for the EU in its continuous development and strengthening of a European defence policy.

To implement a maritime strategy, underpinned by cooperation and integration of EU and NATO efforts, there needs to be a strong political backing. There was a strong sense, amongst panelists, that cooperation, coordination and trust can already be found at the operational level; a number of operations carried by the EU and NATO in cooperation attest to this. The real issue lies at the political level. Within the EU there is a considerable difference of power between the center – mainly France and Germany – and the periphery, as well as between North and South: the different notions of security threats, as well as threat level, hamper political dialogue and there is a real need for operational staff to bridge the security discourse across the Union. Across the Atlantic, there also needs to be a deeper understanding of the interconnectedness within NATO: the US acts in its own sovereign interests as well when it acts in an alliance with the EU due to its economic interconnectedness; the EU, on the other hand, does need to step-up its common defence policy project in order to be the backbone of security efforts where the US may have less relevance or presence. In other words, in order to implement a maritime strategy, underpinned by cooperation and integration of EU and NATO efforts, there needs to be a strong political backing.
The morning panel set up the strategic context within which the structural integration of EU and NATO efforts to tackle the 21st century challenges needs to take place.

To do so, cooperation and coordination are crucial at the institutional level; the lunchtime session sought to demonstrate that they are also indispensable at operational level. Jointness aims to achieve interoperability across land, air and sea to facilitate efficient cross-domain integration, cooperation and coordination. It is key to ensuring that EU and NATO forces are capable of strengthening their deterrence and defence posture for a 360 degrees comprehensive approach to crisis management. The implementation of such comprehensive approach to threat management, however, is regularly challenged by a number of institutional barriers.

If implemented correctly, jointness has the potential to not only facilitate the centralisation of various processes, but also to encourage an increased understanding across all domains of the armed forces. Jointness at its best can foster the implementation of a better structure for decision-making and procurement as well as a wider perspective of the different domains, thus creating the potential to move beyond sea blindness for the land forces and land blindness for the maritime power. Ultimately, although this was debated during the session, there is also room for cost-efficiency if all domains cooperate efficiently with each other. However, much like cooperation and coordination at the institutional level, jointness across all domains of the armed forces can quickly be limited by the circumstances and the strategic culture of each service. For instance, single services may view jointness
as a threat to their independence, something that can also be reflected in their reluctance to co-author doctrinal documents where a service may be seen as providing more content than another or, more simply, where it might be difficult to see how ideas perceived to be considerably different may converge. The push for jointness may also be seen as more of a political rather than a strategic move, thus lacking considerably in buy-in from the forces meant to work jointly and resulting inevitably in failure – which would not increase jointness’ appeal. 

Yet, there are examples of jointness that prove how strategically important its successful implementation can be. Amphibious operations are a case in point. These operations, which come in all shapes and sizes acting like the Swiss Army Knife of the Navy, are used primarily to enter areas of declining access due to geographic, diplomatic and/or political impediments. Through sea basing of sea, air and land assets, amphibious operations provide access when alternatives ashore are unavailable or unattractive, they offer a tactical operational strategic effect that allows a multitude of actions ranging from rapidly reinforcing coastal regions, to securing or denying access to key terrain and destroying/raiding key enemy infrastructure, to name but a few. They are the answer to preparing the battle space, but they too can fall prey to a lack of mutual understanding between services. Indeed, in

the majority of countries the forces that will be using amphibious capabilities and tactics are subordinate to the Navy, which may have a different major focus; as such, the battle of perceptions and priorities may hinder the efficiency of the joint operation. Interestingly, the increasing levels of diplomacy and cooperation emerging in the space and cyber domains may provide a great framework to test jointness at the next level. Space is not a domain that can work on its own; rather it is an enabler for other domains. The same goes with cyber. Coordination in these two key strategic areas can, for instance, threaten an entire carrier group and decrease their area of operations, or facilitate the navigation and precise positioning, through ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance), SATCOM (Satellite Communications) and GNSS (Global Navigation Satellite System), of a weapon system such as the prompt global strike capability, designed to reach any target within 60 minutes. Both China and Russia have a rather good grasp of the high strategic potential of space and cyber in 21st century warfare, and have been cooperating for quite some time on space infrastructure worldwide. Space and cyber support the Navy in its endeavour to go beyond the water’s edge.

Source: NATO Photo By NO FRAN C. Valverde

Space and cyber support the Navy in its endeavour to go beyond the water’s edge.

Through sea basing of sea, air and land assets, amphibious operations provide access when alternatives ashore are unavailable or unattractive.
The final session of the day completed the discussion on the means for success within the Alliance by discussing the real world power politics governing the policy of information, intelligence and foresight sharing in a context characterised by increasing levels of data processing.

The ability to gather real-time situational awareness and predict, with the highest degree of precision, what will happen in the future hinges upon successful cooperation and coordination between EU and NATO as well as upon successful joint operations. This is primarily due to the fact that, in order to be able to know where the adversary is 24/7, 360 degrees, it is key to fully understand the adversary and be able to predict what their next move might be to a degree that would allow for considerable strategic surprise. For this, signal intelligence (SIGINT) is not enough. Today, large amounts of data can be collected through various means, including increasingly through unmanned systems, and analysed quickly thanks to the progress in artificial intelligence; however, while this may be able to provide the ‘now’, it is only through human regional expertise that this data can be turned into accurate predictions of the ‘when’. Understanding and predicting an adversary is a product of cooperation and coordination to share a deep knowledge of their patterns, gathered not only through SIGINT but through the analysis of their culture, their blogs, their websites, and anything else that might give hints of their way of thinking.

This is particularly relevant in a world where military technology is advancing at an increasing pace, and where we can witness significantly diverging approaches in the way these technological cycles are dealt with by established great powers and emerging powers. Established powers have based their power upon a critical
Rising states that are seeking to overtake established powers tend to ride new technological waves in an attempt to overcome the inherent advantages of the previous generation.

The discrepancy between these two approaches to technological cycles is rooted in two very different modes of functioning. For established powers, new technologies challenge established weapons, bringing with them the necessity to implement new concepts of operation and imposing greater financial and strategic costs. Emerging powers, such as China and Russia, do not burden themselves with such considerations; rather, riding on the back of research and development efforts carried out by established powers, they face lower development costs and quickly build new systems and platforms that can challenge the West on land, in the air and at sea. This is how Russia and China are focusing efforts on the development of technologies such as hypersonic weapons, direct energy weapons and unmanned systems (above, on and below the sea surface), weapons that were not initially pursued by established powers following their development because of traditional bureaucratic resistance to change in that they shatter conventions while presenting their owners with small moments of advantage, and invite them to exploit these fractions of time.

Understanding how these new technologies may affect the land, sea and air domains in order to gather a 360 degree picture of the threat – at present and in the future – therefore requires not only the ability to interpret large amounts of data but also the deep knowledge that comes with expertise. This is where jointness, cooperation and coordination, across domains and between institutions, could improve interconnectedness and facilitate prediction in order to regain strategic advantages.
Strategic Findings

Building on the strategic findings emerging from these discussions, KISS 2019 sought to move forward by encouraging debates on the means the Alliance needs to consider in order to address the key maritime threats and challenges its 29 members and its (European) partners are now facing. Once more, there was strong consensus that the time to focus primarily on interventions in far away countries, deploying troops for peacekeeping and delivering aid by land, air and sea, is now over. The resurgence of great power competition, which no longer involves Russia alone but also includes China, now clearly requires a paradigm shift in the way NATO and its allies conceive of defence and deterrence. While the US relationship with NATO is possibly at its worst since the creation of the Alliance, and as Europe lives through a political crisis that is deeply dividing its nations threatening the Union itself, Russia and China have focused on rebuilding their fleet with a view to reassert themselves in the maritime domain.

China’s increased maritime assertiveness, Russia’s actions at Europe’s flanks, the migrant crisis in the Mediterranean, the emerging crisis in the Strait of Hormuz, and piracy on sea lines of communication key to Europe’s economic development, are all pointing to one uncontested fact: the 21st century is a maritime century.

In this complex geostrategic context, also marked by financial constraints and difficulties in attracting and retaining human resources,
it is more essential than ever to foster structural integration between NATO and the EU. Through a more efficient and equitable division of labour, these two institutions could contribute to strengthening the Alliance and, consequently, reinforce defence and deterrence in key strategic areas of interest. Similarly, improved cooperation, coordination and trust across sea, land and air services, would prove strategically and tactically advantageous. Jointness, if implemented correctly and with strong buy-in from the different services, can truly enable a 24/7, 360 degrees awareness that moves beyond the sole realm of land, air or sea to provide a more comprehensive picture of the threats to be monitored and tackled. Examples of how jointness across services and cooperation between institutions may improve strategic and tactical advantage against rising powers include the use of amphibious forces, exploiting cyber and space technologies, and the sharing of information, intelligence and foresight.

Yet, while these findings resonated with the operational community, getting them across to the political leaders is a different feat altogether. Several interventions during this year’s KISS highlighted that at military level, although perhaps not as perfect or efficient as could be, coordination, cooperation and jointness are already taking place. NATO military exercises and training are particularly useful in this sense, contributing to fostering a sense of mutual understanding and shared challenges, reinforcing the need to step-up military capabilities and improving burden sharing. At the political level, however, institutional barriers continue to hamper these efforts. Politicians continue to function in silos, at times suffering from sea blindness and others from land blindness, failing to see the full picture and the interconnectedness therein. Bureaucratic resistance to change is also known for repeatedly stifling technological advances, promoting research and development (R&D) but stopping short of building new technologies much to the benefit of emerging powers riding on the back of the West’s R&D efforts. Building on last year’s findings, KISS 2019 has once more encouraged frank and informed conversations that have highlighted opportunities and challenges inherent to structural integration.

Save the date for #KISS20: Tuesday, 23 June 2020
The Kiel International Seapower Symposium is part of the Kiel Seapower Series.

Building on a series of successful maritime security conferences since 2013, the ISPK has decided to establish a designated international forum to discuss maritime security challenges and the roles and missions of naval forces in the 21st century: The Kiel Seapower Series. All events under this series will offer a forum where experts can openly discuss pressing maritime security issues and thus raise awareness to the opportunities and challenges of seapower in a comprehensive fashion. Sensing that the maritime domain remains an opaque area for policy-makers, scientists, and naval officers alike, the series aims to foster dialogue among maritime professionals from diverse, but strategic backgrounds. Ultimately, the series also seeks to create momentum within the community of interest to reach out to a broader audience and make the case for the importance of seapower and the need for further research and discussion on these matters. The series’ logo, a trident and a pen, demonstrates our ambitions. Each event marries academic excellence to carefully articulated naval thought anchored in intellectual excellence. It is driven by the conviction that shared knowledge is empowerment.