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The current document, published in 2011, is in need of a revision in light of recent geopolitical developments. “AMS 2.0” will have to align with NATO’s emerging Strategic Concept as well as consider the key maritime interests that tie allied and partner nations together. #KISS18 is part of a series of symposia providing assessments of allied maritime strategy and an impetus for new documents. Whereas this year’s conference will address strategic ‘ends’, #KISS19 and #KISS20 will focus on the ‘means’ and ‘ways’ regarding NATO’s maritime strategy. From strategic and operational assessments of the recent past, to current threats and challenges, as well as joint and combined real-world responses, the Kiel International Seapower Symposia intend to firmly anchor the new AMS within the transatlantic maritime strategic framework. Three panels, punctuated by high-level interventions, as well as a final keynote conversation will shed light on enduring, emerging, and recurring principles a new AMS must address.
08:00 – 08:45
Registration & Welcome Coffee

08:45 – 09:00
Opening: Institute for Security Policy Kiel (ISPK)
- Prof. Dr. Joachim Krause
- Dr. Sebastian Bruns

09:00 – 09:15
Welcoming Remarks
- Daniel Günther, Minister President of Schleswig Holstein

09:15 – 10:45
Panel 1: Making the Case for a New Allied Maritime Strategy
- Dr. Karl-Heinz Kamp, Federal Academy for Security Policy, Berlin
- Magnus F. Nordenman, Atlantic Council, Washington D.C.
- Prof. Dr. Peter Dombrowski, US Naval War College, Newport, RI
- Chair: Dr. Sebastian Bruns, Center for Maritime Strategy & Security, Institute for Security Policy Kiel

10:45 – 11:15
High Level Intervention
- VAdm. Andreas Krause, Chief of German Navy

11:15 – 11:45
Coffee Break, Snacks & Networking

11:45 – 13:30
Panel 2: Common Goals and National Caveats
- Prof. Dr. Geoffrey Till, Kings College, London
- Dr. Steven Wills, Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington VA
- Dr. Nicole Koenig, Jacques Delors Institut, Berlin
- Dr. Kęstutis Paulauskas, NATO Policy and Planning Division, Brussels
- Chair: Dr. Eric Thompson, Center for Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA

13:30 – 14:35
Lunch (Buffet)

14:35 – 14:45
Words of Welcome: Center for Naval Analyses
- Dr. Eric Thompson, Center for Strategic Studies at the Center for Naval Analyses, Arlington, VA

14:45 – 15:15
High Level Intervention
- Adm. (ret.) Mark P. Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy

15:15 – 16:45
Panel 3: Warfighting First – and Then What?
- Prof. Dr. Aletta Mondré, University of Kiel
- Dr. Kevin Rowlands, Kings College, London
- Prof. Dr. Eric Grove, University of Cambridge

16:45 – 17:15
Coffee Break & Networking

17:15 – 18:00
Keynote Conversation
- Dr. Sebastian Bruns, ISPK
- Dr. Eric Thompson, CNA
- Adm. (ret.) Mark P. Fitzgerald, U.S. Navy
- RAdm. Jens Nemeyer, Allied Maritime Command Northwood

18:00 – 19:00
Reception with G&T and sodas on site
Courtesy of BHM Penlaw & Tethys Naval
Executive Summary:
The sea has and continues to be the physical manifestation of the world wide web, acting as the engine of globalization and liquid highway for the movement of goods.

Although this expansion of commercial activity has been lucrative, it has simultaneously been mirrored by a proliferation of hostile actors who have injected instability. These hazards extend to both North American and European members of NATO, whose collective security is increasingly under threat due to the litany of risks at sea. Consequently, against the backdrop of this new maritime environment, it is a worthwhile exercise for the transatlantic community at large and its umbrella organizations to revisit its Allied Maritime Strategy of 2011 (AMS) and assess if its content and policies are sufficient in dealing with these contemporary threats? Nowhere is this conversation better suited to take place than at the Kiel International Seapower Symposium. The symposium (KISS, in short) gathers an array of internationally recognized maritime and security experts from a diverse set of professional fields and brings them together with emerging thought-leaders in international security. With its rich naval history flowing through the city’s bloodstream, Kiel offers the ideal setting for KISS 2018 to set the tone and take the lead on this pertinent topic. The symposium takes place during Kiel Week, Europe’s largest maritime festival and a traditional naval event.

Rapporteur: Roger Hilton, Non-Resident Fellow at ISPK
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Establishing such a baseline was critical to first understand NATO’s intrinsic link to the sea and how its members are prepared to address the evolving threats. What emerged from this initial question was that maritime capabilities on both sides of the Atlantic have been neglected for quite some time. For too long, Europe has taken American maritime presence for granted and been lulled into a sense of complacency by the ostensible gains of the post-Cold War peace dividend. This combination not only produced a series of underwhelming procurement policies but provides context to why the aggressive actions of the Russian Federation in the Crimean Peninsula in 2014 came as such a harsh wakeup call. As a result, American commitment to Article 5 vis-à-vis a Russian attack on a European ally suddenly became relevant again. Even prior to Russia’s revanchist foreign policy, the Obama administration’s “Pivot to Asia” in 2012 subtracted forces from an already relatively small American military footprint on the European continent. This policy shift was an early and clear indicator that Europe had to shoulder more responsibility for its own security. Consequently, Europe had more than enough incentive to take ownership of protecting itself due, in large measure, to its global and lucrative commercial interests. Germany as a major export nation relies heavily on its container fleet and free sea lines to facilitate the movement of goods captures this sentiment, which additionally extends to other European nations and NATO allies.
Despite this feature, the conventional forces of many states in question are not capable of effectively reacting to, say, the closure of the Strait of Malacca and to stave off the devastating effects such an incident would have at home. Beyond the protection of commercial interests and safeguarding commerce at sea, Russia’s increasing investments in a modern submarine fleet represents a cause for concern for European NATO nations as antisubmarine warfare capabilities have been degraded. Still, reservations about Moscow’s ability to disrupt sea lines of communications (SLOCs) and damage the extensive network of fiber optic cables that line the ocean floor persist. Securing the SLOCs and ensuring their functionality during both times of peace and war is a top priority and emerging deficiencies in this regard must be quickly amended. Sadly, the dilapidated state of readiness and power-projection/deterrence capabilities of many states’ armed forces – and navies in particular – makes this task even harder.

Within the political domain, the ascension of the Trump administration has challenged the very existence of NATO and the notion of “transatlanticism”. Both sides of the Atlantic have entered into a period of profound adjustment which remains in a state of flux. Most daunting about this transformation is that it appears that NATO commitments have become conditional. Such a shift from unconditional to conditional commitments delegitimizes the membership of the Alliance and raises the prospect of adversaries, most notably Russia, exploiting sources of internal tension to their advantage. Additionally, Moscow’s recent foreign policy adventurism is partly explained by the Obama administration’s de-motion of Russia as the primary geopolitical foe, which it characterized as a “regional power” with limited global clout. As Moscow was no longer considered the threat it once was, containing Beijing’s rise and expansionism in the twenty-first century assumed the top geopolitical priority of Washington. This trend has continued into the Trump administration, which deems China as the sole great-power challenger to American hegemony. This policy recalibration has, by extension, simultaneously reduced Europe’s global relevancy from America’s vantage point, who no longer deem Europe as being on the “front line” in a global struggle.

From the nascent period of the Cold War, America’s engagement on the continent has always looked to defend and advance its own strategic interest. Therefore, Europe today must find areas to help Washington facilitate and advance the policies that demonstrate tangible gains and justify the United States’ continued investments in European security. National leaders on the continent must begin to pay more attention beyond their immediate neighborhood, both for their countries and to satisfy American ambitions. Europe’s limited participation in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2018 military exercise is a good example of this as it shows limited European awareness of U.S. goals in the wider Indo-Pacific. As Europe’s explores more distant out-of-area operations, it should not overlook consolidating its core responsibilities as its initial priority when pursuing viable policies in the maritime domain.

As Europe contemplates broadening its geographic horizon, any expansion must be conducted in concert with acquiring more defense capacity, as well as improving the readiness of its military forces. This acquisition of new capacity is especially important to larger European countries, which must be willing to compensate for smaller and less financially sustainable countries. As it relates to the maritime domain, serious and long-overdue investments are needed based on both the domestic and external justifications. In some cases, reaching and even surpassing the two percent defense spending minimum is required, not to appease the Trump administration but because Europe is desperately in need of more modern capacity to match today’s challenges.

As conceived, the AMS of 2011 was designed to satisfy an expedi- tionary era within a permissive security environment where rogue states and non-state actors topped the threat matrix. Unfortunately, the re-emergence of great power rivalries has transformed the maritime domain to such an extent that NATO can no longer act as a crisis manager. In short, transatlantic sea control is again under threat. For this reason, the AMS has arguably been ren- dered redundant, opening the possibility for an updated version to address internal and external concerns of NATO. Internally, the
The Alliance has grown to twenty-nine members, which has been mirrored by more inertia and bureaucracy. Consequently, defining a new strategy that aligns ends and means is critical. This is especially difficult given the diversity of opinion on maritime issues and what constitutes the overarching priority for any potential new AMS and for the member states that must underwrite it. It is worth considering that the first and second wave of NATO enlargement concerned sea-based nations, whereby the more recent expansions post-1990 were underscored by land-based nations who do not necessarily attribute the same priority to the sea. This divergence in opinion needs to be bridged by educating those more recent members of the value of securing the maritime domain.

Externally, failure to reorient the AMS toward a great power competition context without a comprehensive strategy would only contribute to the impotency of NATO at sea. Against this backdrop, any potential new AMS must clearly identify the nature of contemporary challenges and the role of maritime forces have in meeting these threats. It must define the division of labor and composition of Alliance member responsibilities and those of potential partners. In addition, integrating and leveraging new technologies like robotics and unmanned systems must compose a pillar of any AMS transformation. Allocating these features is imperative when assessing the scale of threats from the likes of Russia and China. The significance of the guided-missile frigate Binzhou (FFG-515) of the 29th Chinese naval escort taskforce making a port call during Kiel Week is proof of this potential threat. Despite the historical tensions between Moscow and Beijing, the two countries are now operating within a relationship of convenience, whereby each stands to gain from the other to the detriment of the transatlantic community. Secondary threats derived from Iran and North Korea must simultaneously be addressed when composing policy.

Within the operational environment a torrent of hazards dominates NATO’s territory. The increase presence of adversary military hardware and personnel within the Baltic Sea area threatens both NATO and its partner states. Exercises like Baltic Operations (BALTOPS) are essential to project unity and deterrence in the face of a potential high-end conflict zone. As Russia continues to deploy anti-access area denial (A2AD) capabilities such as the S-400 air defense system in Kaliningrad, NATO must continue to respond in a measured and proportional way. The same resolve and commitment must extend to the Mediterranean where similar military capabilities are being deployed by Russia, which ultimately threaten the balance of power. Global warming has repositioned the Arctic as an upcoming epicenter for global competition to control the opening of commercial transit lines and traffic. Thus far, Russia has gained the initiative in this domain and is investing heavily in capabilities. Complicating matters for NATO are the conflicting views of its members as to the adequate response needed. With busier adversary activity throughout the Greenland-Iceland-United Kingdom (GIUK) gap in the North Atlantic, Washington’s decision to reactivate the Second Fleet and establish a new Atlantic Command under NATO confirms its priority to demonstrate a capable and credible deterrence effect.
Panel 2: Common Goals and National Caveats

Building on the momentum of the morning, the lunchtime session sought to establish strategic goals of NATO and its partners and what contribution the AMS 2.0 could make in achieving these aims that subsequently took into consideration manifold national caveats.

At the outset, the preconception of national caveats as subtractions from what a country could be challenged. Instead caveats could alternatively be interpreted as an addition of what other inputs members might be able to contribute to NATO’s collective security and strategy that goes beyond the baseline of what the Alliance already shares.

Based on historical experience, generating maritime power within NATO can be a long and frustrating process. A series of complications such as; delayed decision-making, unpredictable member behavior, and contrasting set of national values and aims all impede the formation of a grand strategy. These shortcomings in the maritime domain are evident and amplified when overlooking the disorder at sea based on the multiplication of threats and proliferation of accessible technologies. To overcome these obstacles in a timely fashion, posture as a viable substitution for strategy is taking on more relevance and utility. Therefore, the time has arrived for NATO to rebalance its posture from an expeditionary force to the defense of the homeland. As designed, the AMS of 2011 was composed based on the need for reassurance that did not explicitly state malign intent from Moscow. As the annexation of Crimea in 2014 demonstrated, the Alliance’s projection of deterrence had failed, and NATO had to return to a position of being prepared for conflict. The subsequent reassurance initiatives from the Wales (2014) and Warsaw (2016) NATO summits have returned a level of respect regarding Moscow’s strategic calculus.
NATO’s new posture extends to three distinct functions; strategic, security, as well as warfighting. Although NATO retained the capability to react in all three domains, shaking of the entropy of warfighting remains a major challenge. The allied maritime posture compromises an inventory of 600 vessels, among which were 11 smaller and larger aircraft carriers, a total of 350 warships of various sizes, as well as 150 patrol aircraft. Within the context of these figures, leveraging this inventory effectively to best match capabilities to tasks should anchor thinking and be a guiding principle for policy planners. Being better prepared to deploy a NATO surveillance mission to watch over an adversary asset like the Admiral Kuznetsov carrier as it passed the English Channel and the Strait of Gibraltar to conduct airstrikes from off the coast of Syria or avoiding the use of high-end naval assets to chase migrant boats illustrate this matching challenge. As NATO begins to treat the seas that surround member states with a sense of interconnectedness, it will only help to reinforce a 360-degree approach to the maritime domain. Additionally, any new maritime procurement should abandon the long-standing “can do approach” of navies. This phenomenon is not a sustainable approach where only a few select navies are capable of bootstrapping based on the demands of the current naval domain.

Furthermore, the current AMS is vague in describing hard commitments. This feature leaves policy makers handicapped when attempting to secure public or governmental approval to initiate a potential AMS revision in the future. Consequently, an option NATO should consider when surveying the maritime domain is less of a new strategy but, perhaps, a more detailed collection of policies; an operationalization of the strategy, to be precise. Without increased substantive definitions of what is required to address the Alliance’s maritime threats, any new AMS would run the risk of repeating the errors of the 2011 version. As it pertains to the wide-ranging menu of naval caveats, a case study on SLOCs attempted to inject some perspective to NATO’s decision-making process within the maritime domain by contrasting the U.S. Navy’s risk attribution to SLOCs from the Soviet Union. What emerged was a fundamental misunderstanding of the adversary’s core objectives and an overemphasis on protecting the SLOCs as the “be all, end all policy”.

Through a detailed historical analysis of Soviet and Russian naval doctrine from the 1960s until today, the flaws of the U.S. Navy’s approach to the strategic value of SLOCs provides important lessons learned for the Alliance as they ponder the necessity of an updated AMS. At its root, the U.S. Navy saw the problem it wanted to see and therefore policy suffered from “self-mirroring”. This policy formation of the past lacked a concrete approach to the
The KISS symposia provide a strategic scope to maritime issues.

Strategists, with or without a military uniform, gather in Kiel.

The adversary’s force structure capabilities while simultaneously taking liberties in predicting technological developments. The unsubstantiated speculation provided by CNO Admiral Chester Nimitz to President Harry Truman in 1948 on Soviet submarine capabilities in the near future confirmed this inaccuracy. Additionally, the U.S. Navy’s position failed to integrate a deep historical perspective which is essential when preparing for the future. This disregard can produce disastrous consequences, where self-obsession of a perceived threat can lead to poor procurement and training choices that can take decades to rectify. To avoid this shortcoming when it comes to a new AMS revision, NATO must emphasize open-source intelligence where data collected from publicly available sources is better integrated in the planning process. Credence to this proposal can be found when reviewing the Russian Federation’s 2011 Naval Doctrine that outlined and pre-viewed Moscow’s motivations within the international system and the capabilities at their disposal.

Above all, the Alliance ought to continue to look through the lens of the future instead of the last conflict. Although establishing a historical narrative of any adversary is vital, assessing the mission holistically and prescribing the appropriate ways and means is paramount to raise the prospect of success. To contextualize this rationale, although the Russian navy has returned with modernized capabilities, the chance of a submarine campaign in the Atlantic are unlikely given their deficiency of platforms in this department. Consequently, two takeaways for NATO to address is the Greenland, Svalbard, North Cape Gap and the SLOC line from the Russian Submarine bastions heading south/southeast through the Norwegian sea and into the Atlantic.

When it comes to linchpin partnerships for the Alliance, the role of the EU and its cooperation with NATO continues to expand. Since 2003, the EU’s strategic awareness has matured and assumed important steps in its development where it is looking to add value to the Union’s existence. It possesses a broad civilian military toolbox with potential but, at times, it is slow in reaction due to the necessary coordination among member states and governments. Furthermore, a complementary element the EU brings to bear within the maritime domain is its market power, which can be leveraged to improve sea governance as well as environmental regulations. Nonetheless, striking a balance between the member states’ interests and the integration of military resources remains a daunting political challenge to complete.

Within the current European security landscape, terrorism and migration have dramatically risen in priority. Although these two elements are marginally mentioned in the 2014 Collective Defense Security Policy (CSDP), reaching a comprehensive strategy that is politically attractive now motivates and guides Brussels. From an operational standpoint, of the six active EU missions two are military in nature whereas half of all personnel involved are working within the maritime domain. Operation Atalanta, a counter-piracy military operation off the Horn of Africa, is highly popular among the member states due to its mixture of humanitarian and commercial aspects as well as the rather limited risks involved. In addition, Operation Sophia, which aims at neutralizing refugee smuggling routes through the Mediterranean, is overwhelmingly supported by the member states. From a public outreach perspective, as these EU missions are linked with crisis-management as oppose to military patrols, they are received more positively compared to NATO missions throughout Europe.

To date 74 common actions have been agreed upon between NATO and the EU, that is underscored by a pronounced overlap in the maritime domain. Despite this, gaps within the maritime domain are still prevalent in the areas of force structure and capacity, which restricts EU operations. On the issue of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), collaboration between both parties remains a work in progress while avoiding duplication is a navigating principle. As the relationship evolves, questions remain if the EU and its member states have an appetite to go beyond “soft” security issues. Until this policy quagmire is resolved at the EU level, the Alliance will continue to take the lead on ‘hard’ security issues and should continue to maximize its partner relationships and develop new ones when appropriate. For the moment, the Alliance’s enhanced posture across the three operational functions seems to be working well. But NATO must eventually shake its land centric approach to warfighting to rebuild critical maritime warfighting skills.

NATO must eventually shake its land centric approach to warfighting to rebuild critical maritime warfighting skills.

Rear Admiral Jens Semeyer from Allied Maritime Command and Prof. Joachim Krause, Director of ISPK, during a coffee break.
Panel 3: Warfighting First – and Then What?

Against the backdrop of the day’s diverse discussions, the final session sought to question the established understanding of military, maritime, as well as naval strategy and the correlation between ends, ways, and means.

It subsequently looked to address and elaborate on ‘secondary’ roles taken on by navies such as: crisis management, peacekeeping, ocean governance, and fishery protection. Returning to the basic tenet of a navy’s purpose, namely warfighting, it was a fitting way to conclude the conference as it aligned well with KISS 2018’s overarching question of a new AMS.

Outside of the military domain, challenges at sea like rising sea-levels and unregulated border crossings are proliferating. Legal regimes have failed to curb environmental degradation as well as illegal unreported and unregulated fishing. The question arises whether, in the long term, this is an area of responsibility and role for NATO to take up? If not, how should nations resort to solving these problems if military options are deemed incompatible? To contextualize the latter dilemma, the Cod Wars that took place over the decades between Iceland and the United Kingdom, both NATO members, is as an example of what can occur when a dispute settlement system is lacking. The reach of these problems among NATO members is further illustrated in the Turbot War in the mid-1990s between Canada and Spain that took place outside of the European continent.

To reduce the chance of military conflict, all NATO members should ratify the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). To date, only the United States and Turkey remain outside of its jurisdiction. Ankara’s reservation about ratifying UNCLOS is explained, in large part, due to its fear of receiving
The ethos of navies to conduct warfighting in times of conflict and diplomacy at peace must not be underestimated.

In opposition to the secondary roles that navies have come to play at sea in the twenty-first century, the ethos of navies to conduct warfighting in times of conflict and diplomacy at peace must not be underestimated. Today naval diplomacy is a product of utilizing available resources that serves a specialized purpose and an exercise nations conduct frequently. This explains why during peace time, navies project the most flexibility and utility where they can participate in a diverse set of operations. Consequently, the concept of "soft" naval diplomacy is undergoing modification that is increasingly straying from its founding principles of navies advancing foreign policy objectives or providing options to national policymakers. Conventionally, supporting allies through a warship’s visit to port can demonstrate the presence of a state and its intentions in a region, thus deterring potential enemies. Despite this, today it is worth considering whether China’s Binzhou frigate participating in Kiel Week is more aligned with what “soft” naval diplomacy of the twenty-first century constitutes compared to the traditional deterrent function of the past. This example demonstrates: extended geographical reach, civilian outreach, and technological prowess, all essential elements when attempting to project power. It also simultaneously begs the question if “soft” naval diplomacy has been repurposed by some states to exclusively build political good as opposed to showing strength against adversaries? Furthermore, as the traditional tenets of international diplomacy retreat due to global communications and austere budgets, the acceptance of more naval diplomatic missions is necessary as a cover to build maritime force structure. When contemplating the return of warfighting functions to the core competencies of the navy, reverting to history and adopting a holistic approach can provide important lessons learned. Amidst all the roles that navies play within the current maritime domain, the ability to wage high-level violence is the distinguishing feature compared to the other maritime bodies such as coast guards.

The ability to protect territory and guarantee freedom of navigation is needed more than ever.

Consequently, with a litany of legitimate maritime claims still unresolved and to support future freedom of navigation, expanding ratification UNCLOS to these two important member states should actively be pursued. At the same time, states like China who have ratified UNCLOS are selective in abiding to the Conventions statutes and thereby instrumentalizing international law on an ad-hoc basis. In the event UNCLOS fails to be accepted globally, a similar model of collaboration like the Arctic Council should be considered in other contested maritime areas. As an example of total political disruption, the concept of an international ocean government could also be conceived as alternative to the current status-quo. Despite the theoretical merits attached to such a model, the current political climate regarding supranational institutions does not lend much confidence to the concept and would likely be rejected by the public.

For this reason, naval roles are fundamentally deterring in nature whereas if mission success is achieved, they can be re-assigned to carry out softer naval diplomacy. What both functions confirm is the inherent flexibility that is subsequently extended when considering the constabulary roles navies have come to play. The merit of a ship that can participate in hunting submarines as well as contribute to disaster relief is a powerful demonstration of this utility. Although western nations have come to leverage this feature within maritime operations, national politicians should not fall victim to their own constabulary success and never stray too far from the navies primary purpose. The threat remains that as navies are directed to pursue more constabulary oriented missions, the diminishment of other traits will inevitably materialize. The ability to protect territory and guarantee freedom of navigation is needed more than ever based on the volatile environment at sea and its ramification on land operations. Consequently, achieving a sweet spot of these naval functions is done through a combination of a “high-low mix” with warships at the top and coast guard vessels at the bottom. For some navies, their purpose is merely to engage in warfighting (e.g. North Korea), while others in contrast are predominantly occupied with coastal defense, maritime search and rescue, or the protection of exclusive economic zones (e.g. Ireland). In both
cases, the need to find a middle-ground provides national navies the opportunity to engage in a broader spectrum of missions. As the sea domain continues to be subject to increased competition and converted into compartments of territories, NATO should fall back on what it was initially conceived to do: provide defense. Engaging in secondary naval activities might have proven beneficial in the past decades. However, based on the emergence of non-state actors and a host of humanitarian disasters, the rupture within the international security landscape requires the Alliance to return to its more traditional modus operandi. For this reason, NATO must rediscover its ability to wage high-level violence within the “high-low mix” of naval functions. That is not to say the Alliance and its member states should demote secondary roles, but merely recognize the needs of the current European security architecture when considering new procurement programs and training regimes. On the issue of governance at the sea, the international community should look to expand the jurisdiction of UNCLOS and when possible use cooperative models to avoid interstate conflicts. Although these models are not perfect, they offer a viable means of dispute settlement and cooperation that should be exhausted to avoid the escalation of hostilities.
Strategic Findings

From the return of great power rivalry to the proliferation of advanced technologies, there is no shortfall of challenges. Consequently, matching these threats will require NATO and Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to take a sober look and gauge if the AMS of 2011 is still an adequate guideline in light of these features. NATO’s presence at sea has witnessed a clear trajectory and evolution. What began as a policy to defend the homeland during the Cold War was gradually replaced with the introduction of expeditionary naval forces in the wake of communism’s collapse in Europe to respond to a permissive security landscape. In contrast to today, the contemporary reemergence of great power rivalries to the international system, has forced the Alliance to urgently rediscover its naval warfighting capabilities and assume more vigilance.

Based on the groundswell of threats at sea, NATO’s calculus within the maritime domain will have to recalibrate to respond effectively.

NATO’s presence at sea has witnessed a clear trajectory and evolution. From the return of great power rivalry to the proliferation of advanced technologies, there is no shortfall of challenges. Consequently, matching these threats will require NATO and Allied Maritime Command (MARCOM) to take a sober look and gauge if the AMS of 2011 is still an adequate guideline in light of these features. NATO’s presence at sea has witnessed a clear trajectory and evolution.

Having undertaken the contemplation of the wide-ranging scenarios the Alliance could be forced to respond to, KISS 2018 was a necessary exercise in reflection that provided some critical findings. It should never be dismissed that as an Alliance of twenty-nine members, it is naïve to assume that there will be a collective agreement of priorities that satisfy all national concerns when it comes to generating future maritime power. That is why, moving forward, NATO and MARCOM should focus less on designing an overarching new strategy, but instead concentrate on rectifying areas of weakness or concern through increased posture solutions that identifies clear division of labor.
and responsibilities of its members. The continued implementation of enhanced posture should be pursued to elevate NATO’s three core functions; strategic, security, as well as warfighting. When possible, Alliance maritime members should strive to achieve this “high-low mix” to help NATO maritime assets to retain flexibility and utility without disregarding warfighting capabilities. As Alliance members look to add force generation to their national militaries, any future procurement programs must strike a balance between ways and means that does not duplicate capabilities or waste assets. In many cases satisfying national politicians will require navies to accept more diplomatic missions to secure financing for force structure into the future. Finally, the ability to protect the defense of the homeland and guarantee freedom of navigation must accentuate all political and operational actions of the Alliance. Failure to follow through on the latter would only accelerate the erosion of the rules-based international order and risk the sovereignty of NATO’s members.

With so much uncertainty in the international system, ensuring transatlantic unity is a linchpin element of safeguarding stability and security. Having gathered a stellar collection of international maritime and security experts, KISS 2018 played its part in contributing to this process by provoking thoughtful discussion and adding to the conversation. It has laid the groundwork for the upcoming conferences KISS 2019 and 2020, which will address the means and ways of Allied Maritime Strategy and try to answer many of the pressing questions raised in the discussion.

save the date for #KISS19:
Tuesday, 25 June 2019

The ability to protect the defense of the homeland and guarantee freedom of navigation must accentuate all political and operational actions of the Alliance.
About the Kiel Seapower Series

The Kiel Seapower Series is part of the Kiel Seapower Series. Building on a series of successful maritime security conferences since 2013, the ISPK has decided to establish a designated international forum to discuss maritime security challenges and the roles and missions of naval forces in the 21st century: The Kiel Seapower Series. All events under this series will offer a forum where experts can openly discuss pressing maritime security issues and thus raise awareness to the opportunities and challenges of seapower in a comprehensive fashion. Sensing that the maritime domain remains an opaque area for policy-makers, scientists, and naval officers alike, the series aims to foster dialogue among maritime professionals from diverse, but strategic backgrounds. Ultimately, the series also seeks to create momentum within the community of interest to reach out to a broader audience and make the case for the importance of seapower and the need for further research and discussion on these matters. The series’ logo, a trident and a pen, demonstrates our ambitions. Each event marries academic excellence to carefully articulated naval thought anchored in intellectual excellence. It is driven by the conviction that shared knowledge is empowerment.

Recently Published

Maritime Security in the Eastern Mediterranean
Kiel International Seapower Symposium 2017
Edited by Jeremy Stöhs and Dr. Sebastian Bruns
2018, 85 pp., pb., € 24.00
eISBN 978-3-8487-8783-6
(ISPK Seapower Series, vol. 1)
nomos-shop.de/30697

The Mediterranean is once again on top of the international community’s agenda, returning as the Mare Nostrum of our time with a host of maritime security challenges and various seapower opportunities. This book provides fresh perspectives on the geopolitics of the Eastern Mediterranean and its geo-economics. It discusses the role of regional stakeholders – such as Israel, Egypt, and Iran – and addresses the challenges for the U.S. Navy and the U.S. Marine Corps. The book will be of special relevance to policy-makers, strategists, intelligence professionals, academics, military thinkers, and those individuals with a deeper interest in the Eastern Med alike.

Dr. Sebastian Bruns is the Head of the Center for Maritime Strategy & Security (CMSS) at the Institute for Security Policy, Kiel University (ISPK).